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Abstract—A multiplicative Gaussian wire-tap channel inspired
by compressed sensing is studied. Lower and upper bounds on
the secrecy capacity are derived, and shown to be relatively tight
in the large system limit for a large class of compressed sensing
matrices. Surprisingly, it is shown that the secrecy capacity of
this channel is nearly equal to the capacity without any secrecy
constraint provided that the channel of the eavesdropper is
strictly worse than the channel of the intended receiver. In other
words, the eavesdropper can see almost everything and yet learn
almost nothing. This behavior, which contrasts sharply with that
of many commonly studied wiretap channels, is made possible
by the fact that a small number of linear projections can make
a crucial difference in the ability to estimate sparse vectors.
I. INTRODUCTION
Following Shannon’s theory in 1949 of information-
theoretic secrecy [1], Wyner introduced the wiretap channel
in 1975 [2]. In the wiretap setting, a sender Alice wishes to
communicate a message to a receiver Bob over a main channel
but her transmissions are intercepted by an eavesdropper
Eve through a secondary wiretap channel. The present paper
analyzes a multiplicative Gaussian wiretap channel inspired
by compressed sensing. The input to the channel is a p-length
binary vector. The channel output is a linear transform of
the input after it has first been corrupted by multiplicative
white Gaussian noise. We analyze the setting where Bob and
Eve observe different linear transforms characterized by two
different channel matrices.
Secrecy via compressed sensing schemes has received little
attention from an information-theoretic viewpoint. In prior
work, authors consider using a sensing matrix as a key (un-
known to the eavesdropper) for both encryption and compres-
sion [3]. Privacy via compressed sensing and linear program-
ming decoding was explored in [4]. By contrast, this paper
assumes that the sensing matrices are known (non-secret);
as a special case, Eve’s sensing matrix might correspond to
a subset of the rows of Bob’s channel matrix. Our analysis
shows that certain channel matrices, inspired by compressed
sensing, allow for secrecy rates that are nearly equal to the
main channel capacity even if Eve’s capacity is large.
A. Channel Model
Outlined in Fig. 1, the multiplicative Gaussian wiretap
channel with binary vector input is characterized by
Y = AbWX, (1)
Z = AeWX, (2)
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Fig. 1. (Multiplicative Gaussian Wiretap Channel) For each block length n,
Alice transmits a sequence of n binary valued support vectors X ∈ {0, 1}p
over a main channel characterized by a matrix transform so that Bob receives
Y = AbWX. The eavesdropper Eve receives Z = AeWX.
where X ∈ {0, 1}p is the transmitted signal, and Y ∈ Rmb ,
Z ∈ Rme are the received real-valued signals at the legitimate
user and eavesdropper, respectively. A related channel model
in [5] also involves a wire-tap setting with binary input and
real-valued output. The dimensions of the channel satisfy 0 ≤
me < mb < p/2. The linear mixing parameters, matrices Ab ∈
R
mb×p and Ae ∈ Rme×p, are fixed and known to all parties.
The randomness of the channel is derived from W ∈ Rp×p,
a diagonal matrix whose values are i.i.d. Gaussian random
variables with mean zero and variance one. The channel is
assumed to be memoryless between channel uses.
B. Secrecy Capacity
Alice selects a message Sn ∈ [1 : 2npR], where R represents
a normalized rate, and wishes to communicate reliably with
Bob while keeping the message secret from Eve. A (2npR, n)
secrecy code for the multiplicative wiretap channel consists of
the following: (1) A message set [1 : 2npR]; (2) A randomized
encoder that generates a codeword Xn(Sn), Sn ∈ [1 : 2npR],
according to PXn|Sn ; (3) A decoder that assigns a message
Sˆn(Y
n) to each received sequence Yn ∈ Yn. The message
Sn is a random variable with entropy satisfying
lim
n→∞
H(Sn)
np
= R. (3)
A secrecy code is reliable if
lim
n→∞
Pr[Sˆn(Y
n) 6= Sn] = 0. (4)
A secrecy code is secret if the information leakage rate tends
to zero as block length n→∞,
lim
n→∞
I(Zn;Sn)
n
= 0. (5)
Note that this leakage rate is not normalized by p. A nor-
malized rate R is achievable if there exists a sequence of
(2npR, n) secrecy codes satisfying both Eqn. (4) and Eqn. (5).
The secrecy capacity Cs is the supremum over all achievable
rates.
C. Outline
To analyze the secrecy capacity Cs, we first develop bounds
as a function of the channel matrices Ab and Ae. We then
analyze these bounds for certain random matrices in the large
system limit where mb/p → ρb and me/p → ρe as p → ∞
for fixed constants 0 ≤ ρe ≤ ρb ≤ 1/2. Lower bounds on the
secrecy capacity, corresponding to Wyner’s coding strategy for
discrete memoryless channels are developed in Section II-A.
Corresponding upper bounds are derived in Section II-B.
Section II-C provides an improved upper bound under a certain
encoding constraint on Alice. Proofs are given in Section III.
D. Notations
For a matrix A ∈ Rm×p and vector x ∈ {0, 1}p, we
use A(x) to denote the matrix formed by concatenating the
columns indexed by x, and we use A(i) to denote the ith
column of A. Also, we use X pk to denote the set of all
binary vectors x ∈ {0, 1}p with exactly k ones. We use
H2(x) = −x log x − (1 − x) log(1 − x) to denote binary the
binary entropy function. We use log to denote the logarithm
with base two and ln to denote the logarithm with the natural
base.
II. MAIN RESULTS
Csiszar and Korner showed in [6] that the secrecy capacity
of a discrete memoryless wiretap channel is given by
Cs = max
(U,X)
[
1
p
I(U ;Y)− 1
p
I(U ;Z)] (6)
where the auxiliary random variable U satisfies the Markov
chain relationship: U → X → (Y,Z). It can be verified
that this is also the secrecy capacity when the channels have
discrete inputs and continuous outputs (see e.g. [5]).
In some special cases, the secrecy capacity can be computed
easily from (6). For example, if Ab and Ae correspond to the
first mb and me rows of the p×p identity matrix respectively,
then it is straightforward to show that
Cs =
{
mb
p
− me
p
, if me < mb
0 if me ≥ mb
. (7)
In this case, the secrecy capacity happens to be the difference
of the individual channel capacities; thus as me approaches mb
the secrecy capacity tends to zero. In the following sections
we will develop bounds for a class of matrices inspired by
compressed sensing. Interestingly, we will see that the secrecy
behavior of these matrices differs greatly from the behavior
shown in (7).
A. Lower Bounds
We say that a matrix A ∈ Rm×p is fully linearly indepen-
dent (FLI) if the span of each submatrix {A(x) ∈ Rm×m−1 :
x ∈ X pm−1} defines a unique linear subspace of Rm. Examples
of FLI matrices include the first m rows of the p× p discrete
cosine transform matrix or, with probability one, any matrix
whose entries are drawn i.i.d. from a continuous distribution.
A counter example is given by the first m rows of the p× p
identity matrix.
Our first result, which is proved in Section III-A, gives
a general lower bound on the secrecy capacity for any FLI
matrices.
Theorem 1. Suppose that Ab and Ae are fully linearly
independent. If me < mb, then the secrecy capacity is lower
bounded by
Cs ≥
1
p
log
(
p
mb−1
)
− 12p log det(
1
p
AeA
T
e )
+
∑
x∈X p
mb−1
1
( pmb−1)2p
log det
(
1
mb−1
Ae(x)Ae(x)
T
)
. (8)
The lower bound in Theorem 1 is derived by evaluating the
right hand side of (6) when X is distributed uniformly over the
set X pmb−1. We note that the condition me < mb is necessary
to obtain a nontrivial lower bound since the secrecy capacity
may be equal to zero otherwise.
Unfortunately, the bound in Theorem 1 is difficult to com-
pute if mb and p are large. One way to address this issue is to
analyze the behavior for a random matrix (random matrices are
denoted via boldface, uppercase letters). The following result
is proved in Section III-B.
Theorem 2. Suppose that Ab is fully linearly independent and
Ae is a random matrix whose elements are i.i.d. N (0, 1). If
me < mb then the expectation of the secrecy capacity is lower
bounded by
EAe [Cs] ≥
1
p
log
(
p
mb−1
)
− me2p log
(
mb−1
p
)
− log e2p
me∑
i=1
[
ψ
(
p−i+1
2
)
− ψ
(
mb−i
2
)] (9)
where ψ(x) = Γ′(x)/Γ(x) is Euler’s digamma function.
One benefit of Theorem 2 is that the bound is independent
of the realization of the matrix Ae and can be analyzed
directly. An illustration of the bound is shown in Figure 2
as a function of me/p for various values of p with mb/p held
fixed. Remarkably, as p becomes large, the lower bound in
Theorem 2 remains bounded away from zero for all values of
me strictly less than mb. This behavior is in stark contrast to
the secrecy capacity shown in (7).
One shortcoming of Theorem 2, is that the bound holds
only in expectation, and it is possible that it is violated for
a constant fraction of matrices Ae. The next result, which is
proved in Section III-C, shows that, in the asymptotic setting,
the limit of the bound (9) holds for almost every realization
of Ae. We use the notation {A(p) ∈ Rm
(p)×p} to denote a
sequence of matrices indexed by the number of columns p.
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Fig. 2. Illustration of the lower bound in Theorem 2 on the expected secrecy
capacity EAe [Cs] as a function of me for various values of p when Ab
is fully linearly independent, Ae is a random matrix whose elements are
i.i.d. N (0, 1), and mb/p = 0.2.
Theorem 3. Suppose that {A(p)b ∈ Rm
(p)
b
×p} is a sequence of
linearly independent matrices and {A(p)e ∈ Rm
(p)
e ×p} is a se-
quence of random matrices whose elements are i.i.d. N (0, 1).
If m(p)e > m(p)b and m(p)b /p → ρb and m(p)e /p → ρe as
p → ∞ where 0 ≤ ρe ≤ ρb ≤ 1/2, then the asymptotic
secrecy capacity is lower bounded by
lim inf
p→∞
Cs ≥ H2(ρb)−
1
2
[
(1− ρe) log
(
1
1−ρe
)
− (ρb − ρe) log
(
ρb
ρb−ρe
)] (10)
almost surely.
Theorem 3 provides a concise characterization of the lower
bound in the asymptotic setting. The bound is illustrated in
Figure 2 in the case p = ∞. Since the secrecy capacity can be
equal to zero if m(p)e = m(p)b , Theorem 3 shows that there is a
discontinuity in the asymptotic secrecy capacity as a function
of ρe.
B. Upper Bounds via Channel Capacity
This section considers the capacity of Bob’s channel which
is denoted Cb. We note that this capacity gives us an upper
bound on the secrecy capacity.
Upper bounding the capacity is more technically challeng-
ing than lower bounding the secrecy capacity, since the optimal
distribution on X may depend nontrivially on channel matrix
Ab. The following result, which is proved in Section III-D,
serves as a starting point.
Theorem 4. If Ab is fully linearly independent, then the
channel capacity of Bob’s channel is upper bounded by
Cb ≤
1
p
max
(
log
(
p
mb−1
)
, max
mb≤k≤p
c˜(k)
)
+ log p
p
(11)
where
c˜(k) = max
1≤i≤p
mb
2 log
(
1
mb
‖Ab(i)‖2
)
− max
x∈X p
k
1
2 log det(
1
k
Ab(x)Ab(x)
T ). (12)
Although it is tempting to consider the expectation of (11)
with respect to a random matrix (as we did for Theorem 2),
this is difficult since the maximization in (12) occurs inside
the expectation.
Our next result, which is proved in Section III-E, leverages
the strong concentration properties of the Gaussian distribution
to characterize the asymptotic capacity for Gaussian matrices.
Theorem 5. Suppose that {A(p)b ∈ Rm
(p)
b
×p} is a sequence
of random matrices whose elements are i.i.d. N (0, 1). If
m
(p)
b /p → ρb where 0 < ρb ≤ 1/2, then the asymptotic
channel capacity of Bob’s channel is given by
lim
p→∞
Cb = H2(ρb) (13)
almost surely.
Theorem 5 shows that the strategy used in our lower
bounds, namely choosing X uniformly over X pmb−1 achieves
the capacity of Bob’s channel in the asymptotic setting. What
is remarkable is that for this same input distribution, Eve learns
very little about what is being sent, even if her channel matrix
is equal to the first me rows of Bob’s channel matrix.
C. Improved Upper Bound for a Restricted Setting
We say that the distribution is symmetric if Pr[X = x] =
Pr[X = x˜] for all x, x˜ such that
∑p
i=1 xi =
∑p
i=1 x˜i. The
following result is proved in Section III-F.
Theorem 6. Suppose that {A(p)b ∈ Rm
(p)
b
×p} and {A(p)e ∈
R
m(p)e ×p} are sequences of random matrices whose elements
are i.i.d. N (0, 1). If m(p)b > m(p)e and m(p)b /p → ρb, and
m
(p)
e /p → ρe where 0 ≤ ρe ≤ ρb ≤ 1/2, and if Alice is
restricted to use coding strategies that induce a symmetric
distribution on X, then the asymptotic secrecy capacity is
upper bounded by
lim sup
p→∞
Cs ≤ H(X |WX +
√
ρb/ρeV ) (14)
almost surely where X ∼ Bernoulli(ρb), W ∼ N (0, 1) and
V ∼ N (0, 1) are independent random variables.
The bound in Theorem 6 is strictly less than the channel
capacity H2(ρb) for all ρe > 0, and can be computed easily
using numerical integration. We suspect that this result also
holds without the symmetry restriction on X.
D. Illustration of Bounds
The bounds on the asymptotic secrecy capacity given in
Theorems 3, 5, are 6 and illustrated in Fig. 3 as a function of
the size parameter ρe of the eavesdropper channel. The bounds
correspond to the setting where the elements of the matrices
are i.i.d. Gaussian. Note that the lower bound on the secrecy
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Fig. 3. Bounds on the asymptotic (normalized) secrecy capacity Cs of the
multiplicative Gaussian wiretap channel as a function of ρe when ρb = 0.2
and Ab and Ae are random matrices whose elements are i.i.d. N (0, 1).
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Fig. 4. The (normalized) secrecy capacity Cs of the multiplicative Gaussian
wiretap channel as a function of ρe when ρb = 0.2 and Ab and Ae correspond
to the first rows of the identity matrix.
capacity is nearly equal to that of the main channel for all
ρe < ρb.
For comparison, the secrecy capacity for the special case
where Ab and Ae correspond to the first rows of the p × p
identity matrix are shown in Fig. 4. In this case, the secrecy
capacity is equal to the difference of the main channel capacity
and eavesdropper capacity.
III. PROOFS
A. Proof of Theorem 1
Let U = X where X is distributed uniformly over X pmb−1.
Since Ab is fully linearly independent, the probability that Y
is in the range space of Ab(x˜) for any x˜ ∈ X pmb−1 not equal
to the true vector X is equal to zero. Thus, H(X|Y) = 0 and
I(U ;Y) = I(X;Y) = H(X) = log
(
p
mb−1
)
. (15)
Next, since Ae is fully linearly independent and the number
of nonzero values in X is strictly greater than the rank of Ae, it
can be verified that both Z and Z|X have probability densities.
(Note that the condition mb > me is critical here, since Z does
not have a density otherwise.) Thus we can write
I(U ;Z) = I(X;Z) = h(Z)− h(Z|X) (16)
where h(·) denotes differential entropy (see e.g. [7]). The
entropy h(Z) can be upper bounded as
h(Z) ≤ max
Z˜ : E[Z˜Z˜]=E[ZZT ]
h(Z˜)
≤ 12 log
(
(2πe)me det(E[ZZT ])
) (17)
= 12 log
(
(2πe (mb−1
p
))me det(AeA
T
e )
) (18)
where (17) follows from the fact that the Gaussian distribution
maximizes differential entropy and (18) follows from the fact
that
E[ZZT ] = mb−1
p
AeA
T
e . (19)
The conditional entropy h(Z|X) is given by
h(Z|X) = E
[
1
2 log
(
(2πe)me det(Ae(X)Ae(X)
T )
)] (20)
where we used the fact that, conditioned on any realization
X = x, Z is a (non-degenerate) Gaussian random vector with
covariance matrix Ae(x)Ae(x)T . Combining (15), (16), (18),
and (20) with the expression of the secrecy capacity given in
(6) completes the proof of Theorem 1.
B. Proof of Theorem 2
It is straightforward to show that Ae is fully linearly
independent with probability one. Since the secrecy rate is
bounded, it thus follows from Theorem 1 and the linearity of
expectation that
E[Cs] ≥
1
p
log
(
p
mb−1
)
− me2p log
(
mb−1
p
)
−
1
2p
E
[
log det(AeA
T
e )
]
+
∑
x∈X p
mb−1
1
( pmb−1)2p
E
[
log det
(
Ae(x)Ae(x)
T
) ]
.
(21)
Using well known properties of random Gaussian matrices
(see e.g. [8, pp. 99-103]) shows that
E
[
log det(AeA
T
e )] = me + log e
me∑
i=1
ψ(p−i+12 )
E
[
log det(Ae(x)Ae(x)
T )] = me + log e
me∑
i=1
ψ(mb−i2 )
where the second equality holds for every x ∈ X pmb−1.
Plugging these expressions into (21) completes the proof.
C. Proof of Theorem 3
Since Ae is fully linearly independent with probability one,
it is sufficient to consider the asymptotic behavior of the bound
in Theorem 1. If X is a random vector distributed uniformly
over X pmb−1 then AeA
T
e and Ae(X)Ae(X)T are me × me
Wishart matrices with p and mb − 1 degrees of freedom
respectively. Using Lemma 6 in the Appendix gives
lim
p→∞
1
p
log det( 1
p
AeA
T
e ) = µ(ρe)
lim
p→∞
1
p
log det( 1
mb−1
Ae(X)A
T
e (X)) = ρb µ(ρe/ρb)
almost surely where µ(r) = (1 − r) ln
(
1
1−r
)
− r log e. Thus,
lim
p→∞
[
me
p
log
(
mb−1
p
)
1
p
log det(AeA
T
e )
−
∑
x∈X p
mb−1
1
( pmb−1)p
log det(Ae(x)Ae(x)
T )
]
= lim
p→∞
[
me
p
log
(
mb−1
p
)
1
p
log det(AeA
T
e )
− 1
p
log det(Ae(X)Ae(X)
T )
]
(22)
= µ(ρb)− ρb µ(ρe/ρb)
= (1− ρe) log
(
1
1−ρe
)
− (ρb − ρe) log
(
ρb
ρb−ρe
) (23)
almost surely where the substitution in (22) is justified by
the fact that the expectation of 1
mb
log det( 1
mb
A(X)Ae(X)
T )
with respect to both A and X is bounded uniformly for all p
(see the proof of Theorem 2).
Combining (23) with the well known fact that
lim
p→∞
1
p
log
(
p
mb−1
)
= H2(ρb) (24)
completes the proof of Theorem 3.
D. Proof of Theorem 4
Let K =
∑p
i=1Xi denote the number of ones in X. Then,
I(X;Y) = I(X;Y|K) + I(Y;K) (25)
≤ I(X;Y|K) + log p (26)
≤ max
0≤k≤p
I(X;Y|K = k) + log p (27)
where (25) follows from the chain rule for mutual information,
(26) follows from the fact that I(Y;K) ≤ H(k) ≤ log p, and
(27) follows from expanding the term I(X;Y|K). If we define
c(k) = max
X∈X p
k
I(X;Y)
then we have
max
X
I(X;Y) ≤ max
0≤k≤p
c(k) + log p. (28)
To complete the proof, we split the maximization over k into
two cases. For 0 ≤ k < mb we use the simple bound
max
0≤k<mb
c(k) ≤ max
X∈Xk : 0≤k<mb
H(X) = log
(
p
mb−1
)
.
For mb ≤ k ≤ p we use the following lemma.
Lemma 1. If mb ≤ k ≤ p, then c(k) ≤ c˜(k) where c˜(k) is
given in (12).
Proof: Let X have any distribution on X pk where mb ≤
k ≤ p. Since Ae is fully linearly independent, both Y and
Y|X have probability densities and we can write
I(X;Y) = h(Y) − h(Y|X) (29)
where h(·) denotes differential entropy (see e.g. [7]). The
entropy h(Y) can be upper bounded as
h(Y) ≤ max
Y˜ : E[‖Y˜‖2]=E[‖Y‖2]
h(Y˜)
= mb2 log
(
2πe 1
mb
E[‖Y‖2]
) (30)
≤ max
1≤i≤p
mb
2 log
(
2πe k
mb
‖Ab(i)‖
2
) (31)
where (30) follows from the fact that an isotropic Gaussian
vector maximizes differential entropy, and (31) follows from
the fact that
E[‖Y‖2] = E
[
E[‖Y‖2|X]
]
≤ max
x
E[‖Y‖2|X = x]
= max
x
tr
(
Ab(x)Ab(x)
T
)
≤ max
1≤i≤p
k‖Ab(i)‖
2.
The conditional entropy h(Y|X) is lower bounded by
h(Y|X) = E
[
1
2 log
(
(2πe)mb det(Ab(X)Ab(X)
T )
)]
≥ min
x∈X p
k
1
2 log
(
(2πe)mb det(Ab(x)Ab(x)
T )
) (32)
where we used the fact that, conditioned on any realization
X = x, Y is a (non-degenerate) Gaussian random vector with
covariance matrix Ab(x)Ab(x)T . Combining (29), (31) and
(32) completes the proof of Theorem 4.
E. Proof of Theorem 5
Since Ae is fully linearly independent with probability one,
it is sufficient to consider the asymptotic behavior of the bound
in Theorem 4. The limit of the first term in the maximization
is given by (24). To evaluate the second term, we use the
following technical lemmas whose proofs are given in the
Appendices A and B.
Lemma 2.
lim sup
p→∞
max
1≤i≤p
1
mb
‖Ab(i)‖
2 ≤ 1 (33)
almost surely.
Lemma 3. If k ≥ mb and k/p→ κ where ρb ≤ κ ≤ 1, then
lim inf
p→∞
min
x∈X p
k
1
p
log det( 1
k
Ab(x)Ab(x)
T ) ≥ κµ(ρb/κ) (34)
almost surely where µ(r) = (1− r) log
(
1
1−r
)
− r log e.
The convergence show in Lemmas 2 and 3 leads immedi-
ately to the following asymptotic upper bound on the term
c˜(k) defined in (12):
lim sup
p→∞
max
mb<k≤p
1
p
c˜(k)
≤ max
ρb≤κ≤1
1
2
[
ρb log e− (κ− ρb) log
(
κ
κ−ρb
)]
= 12ρb log e
almost surely. Since H2(ρb) > 12ρb log e for all ρb ∈ (0, 1/2),
we conclude that the asymptotic capacity is upper bounded
by H2(ρb). The achievable strategy outlined in the proof
of Theorem 1 shows that H2(ρb) is also achievable which
concludes the proof of Theorem 5.
F. Proof of Theorem 6
Let K =
∑p
i=1Xi. Then, for any pair (U,X) such that
U → X→ (Y,Z), we have
I(U ;Y) − I(U ;Z)
= I(X;Y) − I(X;Z) + I(X;Z|U)− I(X;Y|U) (35)
≤ I(X;Y|K)− I(X;Z|K)
+ I(X;Z|U,K)− I(X;Y|U,K) + 2 log p (36)
≤ max
0≤k≤p
∆(k) + 2 log p (37)
where
∆(k) = I(X;Y|K = k)− I(X;Z|K = k)
+ I(X;Z|U,K = k)− I(X;Y|U,K = k).
We now consider two cases. For the case mb ≤ k ≤ p, we
use the upper bound
∆(k) ≤ I(X;Y|K = k) + I(X;Z|U,K = k)
≤ I(X;Y|K = k) + I(X;Z|K = k)
which follows from the non-negativity of mutual information
and the data processing inequality. Following the steps out-
lined in the proofs of Theorems 4 and 5 shows that
lim sup
p→∞
max
X∈X p
k
: mb≤k≤p
1
p
∆(k) ≤ 12 (ρb + ρe) log e ≤ ρb log e
(38)
almost surely. (Note that this step does not require the sym-
metry assumption.)
Alternatively, for the case 0 ≤ k < mb, we use the bound
∆(k) ≤ H(X|Z,K = k) +H(X|Y,K = k)
which follows from the non-negativity of entropy and the
fact that conditioning cannot increase entropy. Since Ab is
fully linearly independent almost surely, it follows from the
proof of Theorem 1 that H(X|Y,K = k) is equal to zero
almost surely. To characterize the asymptotic behavior of the
remaining term, H(X|Z,K = k), we use the following lemma
which is proved in Appendix C.
Lemma 4. Suppose that X is symmetric. If 0 ≤ k < mb and
k/p→ κ where 0 ≤ κ ≤ ρb, then
lim sup
p→∞
1
p
H(X|Z,K = k) ≤ g(κ, ρe) (39)
almost surely where
g(κ, ρe) = H(X |WX +
√
κ/ρeV ) (40)
and X ∼ Bernoulli(κ), W ∼ N (0, 1) and V ∼ N (0, 1) are
independent random variables.
Noting that g(κ, ρe) is nondecreasing in κ, we obtain the
asymptotic upper bound
lim sup
p→∞
Cs ≤ max
(
g(ρb, ρe), ρb
)
. (41)
It can be verified numerically that this maximum occurs at
g(ρb, ρe) for all ρb ∈ (0, 1/2) which completes the proof of
Theorem 6.
IV. CONCLUSION
Bounds on the secrecy capacity Cs for the multiplicative
Gaussian wiretap channel were analyzed for a class of channel
matrices inspired by compressed sensing. One natural exten-
sion of the observations in this paper would be to consider the
combined effects of additive noise in vector wiretap channels.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 2
Note that the column magnitudes ‖Ab(i)‖2, i = 1, 2, · · · , p
are i.i.d. chi-square random variables with mb degrees of free-
dom. Thus for any ǫ ∈ (0, 1/2), the chi-square concentration
inequality in Lemma 5 in Appendix D gives
Pr[ max
1≤i≤p
1
mb
‖Ab(i)‖
2 ≥ 1 + ǫ] ≤ p exp(− 316⌈ρbp⌉ǫ
2) (42)
which decays exponentially rapidly with p as p→∞.
B. Proof of Lemma 3
For each x ∈ X pk , let
N(Ab,x) =
1
k
log det
(
1
k
A(x)A(x)T
)
. (43)
By the union bound, and the symmetry of Ab we have
Pr
[
min
x∈X p
k
N(Ab,x) ≤ t
]
≤
(
p
k
)
Pr[N(A,x) ≤ t], (44)
for any arbitrary x ∈ X pk . Using the bound
(
p
k
)
≤ (pe/k)k
and Lemma 6 in Appendix D, shows that for any ǫ > 0,
lim sup
p→∞
1
p ln p ln Pr[N(A,x) ≤ µ(ρb/κ)− ǫ] ≤ −ǫ
which suffices to prove almost sure convergence.
C. Proof of Lemma 4
Let Xˆ = 1
me
A
T
e Z. Then, we have
H(X|Z,K = k) ≤ H(X|Xˆ,K = k) (45)
≤
p∑
i=1
H(Xi|Xˆ,K = k) (46)
≤
p∑
i=1
H(Xi|Xˆi,K = k) (47)
where (45) follows from the data processing inequality, (46)
follows from the chain rule and (47) follows from the fact that
conditioning cannot increase entropy.
Next, we observe that Xˆi can be written as
Xˆi =
1
me
p∑
i=1
〈Ae(i),Ae(j)〉WjXj (48)
=
‖Ae(i)‖2
me
WiXi + σi(Ae,X)V (49)
where V ∼ N (0, 1) is independent of Wi, Xi and σ2i (Ae,X)
where
σ2i (Ae,X) =
1
me
∑
j 6=i
〈Ae(i),Ae(j)〉
2Xj . (50)
Using standard chi-square inequality, it is straightforward to
show that
lim
p→∞
max
1≤i≤p
|‖Ae(i)‖
2
me
− 1| = 0 (51)
almost surely. With a bit more work, and the use of the fact
that, by the symmetry constraint, X is distributed uniformly
over X pk it can also be shown that
lim
p→∞
max
1≤i≤p
|σ2j (Ae,X)−
κ
ρe
| = 0 (52)
almost surely. Thus, we conclude that the empirical distribu-
tion of the pairs (Xi, Xˆi) converges weakly almost surely to
the distribution on (X,WX+
√
κ/ρeV ), which concludes the
proof.
D. Technical Lemmas
Lemma 5 ( [10]). If X is a chi-square random variable with
n degrees of freedom then for all ǫ ∈ (0, 1/2),
Pr[X ≥ d(1 + ǫ)] ≤ exp
(
− 316dǫ
2
)
. (53)
Lemma 6. Let W be an m×m Wishart random matrix with
n ≥ m degrees of freedom. If m/n → ρ ∈ (0, 1] as n → ∞,
then for any ǫ > 0,
lim sup
n→∞
1
n lnn ln Pr
[∣∣ 1
n
log det( 1
n
W)− µ(ρ)
∣∣ > ǫ] ≤ − ǫlog e
where
µ(ρ) =
{
(1− ρ) log
(
1
1−ρ
)
− ρ log e, if 0 < ρ < 1
− log e, if ρ = 1
. (54)
Proof: We begin with a one-sided bound. For any r > 0
we have
Pr
[
1
n
ln det
(
1
n
W
)
≤ t
]
= Pr [ln det (W) ≤ nt+m logn]
= Pr
[(
det(W)
)−r
≥ exp(−rnt+m logn)
]
≤ exp(rnt + rm logn)E
[(
det(W)
)−r] (55)
where (55) follows from Markov’s inequality. If r < (n −
m)/2, then it can be shown (see e.g. [8, pp. 99-103]) that
E
[(
det(W)
)−r]
= exp(−M(r))
where
M(r) = rm ln(2) +
m−1∑
i=0
[
ln Γ(n−i2 )− ln Γ(
n−i
2 − r)
]
.
If r is an integer then we use the relation
ln Γ(z)− ln Γ(z − r) =
r∑
i=1
ln(z − i)
to obtain
M(r) = rm ln(2) +
m−1∑
i=0
r∑
j=1
ln
(
n−i
2 − j
)
= rm lnn+
m−1∑
i=0
r∑
j=1
ln
(
n−i−2j
n
)
.
Plugging this back into (55) gives
ln Pr
[
1
n
ln det( 1
n
W) ≤ t
]
< rnt−
m−1∑
i=0
r∑
j=1
ln
(
n−i−2j
n
)
.
We now consider what happens as n→∞. If r = lnn then
it is straightforward to show that
lim
n→∞
1
rn
m−1∑
i=0
r∑
j=1
ln
(
n−i−2j
n
)
=
µ(ρ)
log e
,
and thus
lim sup
n→∞
1
n lnn ln Pr
[
1
n
ln det
(
1
n
W
)
≤ t
]
≤ t− µ(ρ)log e .
To prove the other side of the bound, we use the same steps
as before to obtain
ln Pr
[
1
n
ln det( 1
n
W) ≥ t
]
<
m−1∑
i=0
r∑
j=1
log
(
n−i+2j
n
)
− rnt.
Letting r = lnn leads to
lim sup
n→∞
1
n lnn ln Pr
[
1
n
ln det
(
1
n
W
)
≥ t
]
≤ µ(ρ)log e ,−t.
Changing the base of the logarithms concludes the proof of
Lemma 6.
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